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I plan  to  comment  tonight  on  the  need  for  order  in 
international  finance.  My  choice  of  topic  does  not 
require  lengthy  justification.  For  more  than  a decade 
now,  we  have  been  besieged  by  problem  after  prob- 
lem  in  the  working  of  international  financial  mecha- 
nisms.  Strain  and  turbulence  have,  in  fact,  been  so 
constant  a feature  of  the  international  financial  scene 
in  recent  years  that  I  suspect  they  are  coming  to  be 
widely  regarded  as  the  normal  state  of  affairs. 
I  do  not  share  any  such  mood  of  resignation.  In 
the  first  place,  governments  around  the  world  now 
have  a  better  understanding  of  the  troubles  caused 
by  inflation-both  in  their  own  economies  and  in 
international  dealings-than  they  had  only  a  few 
years  ago.  As  a result,  not  a few  countries  have  been 
adjusting  their  economic  policies  with  a  view  to 
curbing  inflation.  In  the  second  place,  financial 
institutions-particularly  commercial  banks-are  now 
giving  closer  attention  to  the  volume  and  character 
of  their  foreign  lending.  And  in  the  third  place,  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  has  been  gaining  in 
prestige  and  is  already  exercising  a  more  construc- 
tive  influence  than  seemed  likely  a  year  or  two  ago. 
These  are  promising  trends,  and  if  we  build  on  them 
we  can  in  time  reattain  the  financial  stability  that  is 
so  vital  to  orderly  expansion  of  the  international 
economy. 
Certainly,  we ail  know  of the  great  difficulties  that 
plagued  financial  relationships  among  countries  dur- 
ing  the  1930’s.  Those  difficulties  generated  pessi- 
mism  about  the  capacity  of  nations  ever  again  to 
achieve  orderly  arrangements  for  the  conduct  of 
international  finances.  And  that  pessimism  was 
deepened  by  the  frightful  disruption  of  the  world 
economy  during  the  war.  Yet,  it  was  the  genius  of 
that  age  to  devise  the  structure  of  Bretton  Woods 
and  to  strengthen  that  extraordinary  structure  with 
our  own  Marshall  Plan.  Within  a  framework  of 
established  financial  rules,  a  great  liberalization  of 
the  world  economy  occurred  and  world  trade  and 
output  flourished.  Although  we  tend  to  forget  it 
now,  the  postwar  period  was  a  time  of  quite  impres- 
sive  stability  in  world  finance  until  the  early  sixties. 
That  experience  should  serve  to  remind  us  that 
difficulties  do yield  to determined  effort.  Our  present 
problems  in  the  sphere  of  international  finance,  while 
different  from  those  of  a  generation  ago,  surely  are 
no  greater.  They  too  can  be  dealt  with  effectively  if 
once  again  we  perceive  the  wisdom  of  some  sub- 
ordination  of  parochial  interests  and  if  nations  mar- 
shal  the  will  to  live  by  new  rules  of  responsible  be- 
havior. 
Quite  obviously,  the  overriding  problem  confront- 
ing  us in world  financial  matters  today  is the  massive 
and  stubborn  imbalance  that  prevails  in  payments 
relations  among  nations-a  condition  arising  im- 
portantly,  although  by  no  means  exclusively,  from 
OPEC’s  action  in  raising  the  price  of  oil  so abruptly 
and  so  steeply. 
This  year  alone  OPEC’s  revenues  from  interna- 
tional  oil  sales  are  likely  to  total  something  on  the 
order  of $130  billion.  What  is most  significant  about 
that  figure  is  rhat  it  represents  an  enormous  explo- 
sion  of  revenues  in  such  a  short  time.  In  1972, 
before  OPEC’s  aggressive  pricing  policy  began,  re- 
ceipts  of  the  OPEC  group  from  international  oil 
sales  totaled  less  than  $14  billion,  with  most  of  the 
rise  since  then  representing  higher  prices  rather  than 
enlarged  volume.  For  the  great  majority  of  OPEC’s 
customers-both  affluent  and  needy  alike-it  has 
been  the  rapidity  of the  massive  change  that  has  been 
so  troublesome.  To  be  sure,  OPEC  members  have 
dispensed  some  aid  to  less  developed  countries,  but 
so  far  the  grants  have  been  very  selective  and  quite 
small  relative  to  the  size  of  the  international  problem 
that  OPEC  has  created. 
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OPEC  group  has  in  effect  levied  on  the  world 
economy  has  been  met,  as  you  know,  partly  by  trans- 
ferring  goods  and  services  to  OPEC  members  and 
partly  by  deferring  such  transfers  through  borrow- 
ing  arrangements.  OPEC’s  absorption  of  goods  and 
services  for  both  consumption  and  development  pur- 
poses  has  been  expanding,  with  the  consequence  that 
OPEC’s  collective  current-account  surplus  has 
shrunk  considerably  from  its  peak  level  of  more  than 
$65  billion  in  1974.  Only  five  of  the  thirteen  OPEC 
nations  in  fact  are  currently  running  sizable  pay- 
ments  surpluses,  Contrary,  however,  to  earlier  wide- 
spread  hopes  that  the  aggregate  OPEC  surplus  would 
continue  to  decline-perhaps  nearing  elimination  by 
the  end  of  this  decade-it  seems  at  present  to  be 
eroding  slowly,  if  at  all.  This  year  it  could  easily 
run  above  $40  billion,  marking  the  fourth  consecu- 
tive  year  that  OPEC’s  trading  partners  as  a  group 
will  have  to  seek  substantial  loans  or  grants  to  help 
meet  their  oil  bills. 
Continuation  of  a  surplus  for  the  OPEC  group  at 
such  a  high-level  reflects  several  influences:  first, 
the  further  increase  that  occurred  this  January  in 
OPEC  oil  prices;  second,  growing  demand  for  oil  as 
recovery  of  the  world  economy  has  proceeded;  third, 
insufficient  energy  conservation  by  many  non-OPEC 
countries,  including  most  notably  the  United  States  ; 
and  fourth,  a  slowing  of  import  absorption  by  the 
OPEC  group-in  some  instances  because  bottleneck 
problems  of  one  kind  or  another  are  being  encoun- 
tered,  in  other  instances  because  development  plans 
have  come  to  be  viewed  as  excessively  ambitious. 
The  apparent  stickiness  of  the  OPEC  payments  sur- 
plus  at  a  high  level,  buttressed  by  what  is  now  a 
significant  stream  of  income  from  investments,  im- 
plies  large-scale  financing  requirements  for  OPEC 
customers  for  a  considerable  period  ahead.  The 
prospect  of  such  persistent  financing  needs,  year  after 
year,  is  especially  worrisome. 
Great  as  must  be  our  attention  to  these  OPEC- 
related  problems,  we  dare  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  our  international  payments  mechanism  is  now 
under  stress  for  reasons  that  go  beyond  the  extra- 
ordinarily  high  price  of  oil.  The  payments  deficits  of 
various  nations,  both  industrial  and  less  developed, 
can  be traced  to  extensive  social-welfare  and  develop- 
ment  programs  undertaken  in  the  early  1970’s  and 
financed  by  heavy  governmental  borrowing,  often 
directly  from  central  banks.  Even  when  the  internal 
stresses  resulting  from  inflation  were  aggravated  by 
the  oil  burden  and  by  weaker  exports,  there  was 
little  or  no  adjustment  of  economic  policies  in numer- 
ous  instances,  thus  causing  external  positions  to  de- 
teriorate  sharply.  There  were  conspicuous  excep- 
tions,  of  course,  particuIarly  on  the  part  of  countries 
that  historically  have  the  greatest  sensitivity  either  to 
inflation  or  payments  imbalance,  or  both.  A  wide 
diversity  of  payments  imbalances  thus  developed 
around  the  globe,  accentuated  for  a  time  by  differ- 
ences  in  the  severity  with  which  recession  affected 
national  economies  and,  more  recently,  by  differing 
inflation  and  recovery  trends. 
The  current  pattern  of  international  payments  im- 
balances,  in  short,  is  something  far  more  complex 
than  an  OPEC  phenomenon  alone.  Essentially,  wh.at 
prevails  is  a  problem  within  a  problem.  First, 
the  non-OPEC  group  of  countries  collectively  has  a 
massive  structural  deficit  vis-a-vis  OPEC.  In  addi- 
tion,  serious  payments  imbalances  exist  within  the 
non-OPEC  sector  itself,  with  a  few  nations  experi- 
encing  sizable  surpluses  on  their  current  account 
while  many  others  suffer  deficits  that  reflect  many 
factors  besides  the  way  in  which  the  burden  of  costly 
oil  imports  happens  to  be  distributed  around  the 
globe. 
A great  deal  of  effort  has  been  devoted  by  schol:ars 
to  the  task  of trying  to  estimate  how  long  the  present 
severe  imbalance  of  international  payments  accounts 
could  persist  in  the  absence  of  dehberate  new  policy 
actions.  The  results  of  these  exercises  generally  are 
not  reassuring.  They  point  to  the  distinct  possibility 
that  huge  borrowing  needs-that  is,  needs  that  are 
uncomfortably  large  in  relation  to  the  debt-servicing 
capabilities  of  many  countries---could  persist  at  least 
through  the  remainder  of  this  decade. 
The  potential  trouble  in  this  set  of  circumstances 
should  be  obvious.  If  OPEC  surpluses  on  current 
account  should  continue  on  anything  like  the  present 
scale,  they  would  inevitably  be  matched  by  deficits 
of  identical  magnitude  on  the  part  of  other  nations. 
And  if  some  countries  outside  OPEC  should  also 
have  sizable  and  persistent  surpluses,  as  now  appears 
to  be  the  case,  the  aggregate  deficit  of  the  remaming 
countries  will  be  still  larger.  Under  such  circ:um- 
stances,  many  countries  will  be  forced  to  borrow 
heavily,  and  lending  institutions  may  well  be  tempted 
to  extend  credit  more  generously  than  is prudent.  A 
major  risk  in  all  this  is  that  it  wouid  render  the 
international  credit  structure  especially  vulnerable  in 
the  event  that  the  world  economy  were  again  to 
experience  recession  on  the  scale  of  the  one  from 
which  we  are  now  emerging. 
To  minimize  the  risks  that  face  us,  there  is a  clear 
need  for  a  strong  effort  involving  all  major  parties 
at  interest.  In  order  to  achieve  relatively  smooth 
expansion  of  the  world  economy,  five  conditions  are 
essential  : first,  the  aggregate  of  payments  imbalances 
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rapidly  than  currently  observable  trends  imply;  sec- 
ond,  the  divergences  that  now  exist  among  countries 
with  regard  to  their  balance-of-payment  status  need 
to  be narrowed  ; third,  protectionism  must  be  scrupu- 
lously  avoided  by governments  ; fourth,  private  finan- 
cial  institutions  need  to  adhere  to  high  standards  of 
creditworthiness  in  providing  whatever  volume  of 
international  financing  occurs  during  the  next  few 
years;  and  fifth,  official  credit  facilities  need  to  be 
significantly  enlarged. 
The  realization  of these  conditions  requires  diligent 
pursuit  of  stabilization  policies  by  countries  that  have 
been  borrowing  heavily  in international  markets.  The 
obstacles  to  speedy  adjustment  on  the  part  of  these 
countries  are  well  known.  Resistance  stems  chiefly 
from  the  political  difficulty  of  gaining  broad  accept- 
ance  of  the  painful  things  that  must  be  done  to  re- 
strain  inflation  and  to  achieve  energy  conservation, 
Countries  thus  find  it  more  attractive  to  borrow  than 
to  adjust  their  monetary  and  fiscal  policies;  and  if 
they  can  do  this  without  having  lenders  write  re- 
strictive  covenants  into  loan  agreements,  so much  the 
better.  That  is  why  countries  typically  prefer  to  tap 
foreign  credit  markets  to  the  maximum  extent  pos- 
sible  rather  than  borrow  from  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  which,  in  aiding  countries  that  ex- 
perience  significant  payments  disequilibrium,  makes 
credit  available  only  after  the  borrower  has  agreed 
to  follow  internal  policies  judged  appropriate  by  the 
Fund.  Commercial  banks,  as a practical  matter,  have 
neither  the  inclination  nor  the  leverage  to  impose 
restrictive  covenants  on  sovereign  governments. 
In  these  circumstances,  admonition  alone  is  likely 
to  accomplish  little  in  prodding  countries  with  large 
payments  deficits  to  take  affirmative  action.  There 
are,  however,  limits  dictated  by  financial  prudence 
beyond  which  private  lenders  will  be unwilling  to  go. 
More  than  one  country  has  recently  found  that  its 
ability  to  borrow  in  the  private  market  has  dimin- 
ished.  The  fact  is  that  commercial  banks  generally, 
and  particularly  those  which  have  already  made  ex- 
tensive  loans  abroad,  are  now  evaluating  country 
risks  more  closely  and  more  methodically.  Credit 
standards  thus  appear  to  be  firming;  and  as  infor- 
mation  about  borrowing  countries  improves,  we  can 
reasonably  expect  the  market  to  perform  its  function 
of  credit  allocation  more  effectively. 
As  some  of  you  may  know,  the  Federal  Reserve  is 
currently  engaged  in  a  joint  project  with  other  cen- 
tral  banks  to  obtain  a  much  more  complete  size  and 
maturity  profile  of  bank  credit  extended  to  foreign 
borrowers,  country  by  country.  That  information, 
which  is  being  gathered  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Bank  for  International  Settlements,  will  be  shared 
with  private  lenders,  but  even  so  it  will  fill  only  a 
fraction  of  the  esisting  informational  gap. 
What  we  need  is  a  more  forthcoming  attitude  on 
the  part  of  borrowing  countries  in  regularly  supply- 
ing  information  to  lenders  on  the  full  range  of  eco- 
nomic  and  financial  matters  relevant  to  creditworthi- 
ness.  I  realize  that  much  of  the  needed  information 
is  not  even  collected  in  some  countries,  but  such  a 
condition  should  not  be  tolerated  indefinitely.  Logi- 
cally,  the  BIS-having  links  with  the  central  banks 
of  the  principal  lending  countries-could  take  the 
lead  in  setting  forth  a  list  of  informational  items  that 
all  countries  borrowing  in  the  international  market 
would  be  expected  to  make  available  to  present  or 
prospective  lenders.  Compliance  could  then  become 
a  significant  factor  in  the  ability  of  countries  to  se- 
cure  private  credit,  particularly  if-as  I  would  judge 
essential-bank  regulators  in  the  various  lending 
countries  explicitly  took  account  of  compliance  in 
their  review  of  bank  loan  portfolios. 
Imperfect  or  incomplete  information,  as  I  think 
we  all  recognize,  makes  for  inefficient  markets  and 
heightens  the  risk  of disruptive  discontinuities  if some 
previously  unknown  but  pertinent  fact  suddenly 
comes  to  light.  In  the  market  for  bank  credit,  a 
continuous  flow  of  factual  information  will  produce 
gradual  as  distinct  from  abrupt  changes  in  assess- 
ments  of  creditworthiness.  This  should  induce 
earlier  recourse  to  the  IMF  by  countries  experi- 
encing  payments  difficulties  than  was  usually  the 
case  in  the  past.  Even  now,  as  lenders  are  becoming 
better  informed  and  somewhat  more  cautious  in  ex- 
tending  foreign  credit,  a  tendency  toward  earlier 
recourse  to  the  IMF  appears  to  be  emerging.  It 
seems  likely,  therefore,  that  more  countries  that  need 
to  adjust  their  economic  policies  will  henceforth  do 
so  sooner  and  probably  also  more  effectively.  By 
so  doing,  the  unhappy  alternative  of  resorting  to 
protectionism  will  be  more  readily  avoided. 
Private  banks-both  in  this  country  and  elsewhere 
-played  a very  substantial  role  in  “recycling”  petro- 
dollars  between  the  OPEC  group  and  other  countries, 
especially  those  whose  external  payments  position 
was  weakened  by  the  higher  oil  prices.  Had  the 
banks  not  done  so,  the  recent  recession  would  have 
been  more  severe  than  it  was,  since  there  was  no 
official  mechanism  in  place  that  could  have  coped 
with  recycling  of  funds  on  the  vast  scale  that  became 
necessary  in  1974.  But  with  many  countries  now 
heavily  burdened  with  debt,  bankers  generally  recog- 
nize  that  prudence  demands  moderation  on  their  part 
in  providing  additional  financing  for  countries  in 
deficit.  For  that  reason,  they  understandably  wish 
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financial  support  to  countries  that  continue  to  have 
large  borrowing  needs. 
Bankers  are  not  alone  in  wanting  to  see  countries 
in  deficit  pursue  adjustment  policies  more  diligently. 
This  interest,  in  fact,  is  widely  shared  by  economists 
and  other  thovghtful  citizens  who  see  an  urgent  need 
for  healthier  and  more  prosperous  economic  condi- 
tions  around  the  world.  The  interests  of  the  inter- 
national  economy  and  of  private  lenders  thus  con- 
verge  and  point  to  the  need  for  a  much  more  active 
role  by  the  Fund, 
The  leverage  of  the  Fund  in  speeding  the  process 
of  adjustment  would  clearly  be  enhanced  if  its  ca- 
pacity  to  lend  were  greater  than  it  is  now.  One 
reason  why  countries  often  are  unwilling  to  submit 
to conditions  imposed  by  the  IMF  is that  the  amount 
of  credit  available  to  them  through  the  Fund’s  regu- 
lar  channels-as  determined  by  established  quotas- 
is  in  many  instances  small  relative  to  their  structural 
payments  imbalance.  That  will  be  so  even  after  the 
scheduled  increase  in  I&IF  quotas  becomes  effective. 
To  remedy  this  deficiency,  the  Fund  is  currently 
seeking  resources  of  appreciable  amount  that  could 
be  superimposed  on  the  framework  of  the  quota 
system.  Negotiations  are  in  progress  with  several 
countries  of  the  OPEC  group  as  well  as  with  the 
‘United  States  and  other  industrial  nations  whose 
payments  position  is  comparatively  strong.  Such  a 
supplementary  Fund  facility  should  induce  more  defi- 
cit  countries  to  submit  to  Fund  discipline.  But  in  no 
case  must  it  become  a  substitute  for  an  adequate 
adjustment  policy  by  borrowers  or  serve  as  a bailout 
for  private  .banks.  If  negotiations  for  such  a  facility 
are  completed  soon,  which  appears  possible,  high 
priority  should  be  given  to  prompt  ratification  by 
our  Congress  and  the  legislatures  of  other  countries. 
The  ability  of  the  Fund  to  act  forcefully  in  speed- 
ing  the  adjustment  process  will  be  strengthened  in 
still  another  way  once  the  five-year  effort  of  amend- 
ing  the  IMF’s  Articles  of  Agreement  is  completed. 
At  present  the  Fund  normally  immerses  itself  in 
urging  appropriate  policies  on  a  country  only  when 
that  country  applies  for  financial  assistance.  Under 
the  revised  Articles,  the  Fund  could  take  the  initia- 
tive  in  determining  whether  individual  countries  are 
complying  with  formally  prescribed  obligations  to 
foster  orderly  economic  growth  and  price  stability. 
This  authority,  once  available,  will  enable  the  IMF 
to  broaden  progressively  its  oversight  role  even  when 
a country  is not  an  applicant  for  a  loan. 
As  the  number  of  countries  brought  within  the 
reach  of  the  Fund’s  influence  increases-either  be- 
cause  of  the  enticement  of  enlarged  lending  facilities 
a 
or  because  an  IMF  “certificate  of  good  standing” 
becomes  essential  to  further  borrowing  from  private 
lenders-the  outlook  for  correction  of  balance-of- 
payments  deficits  would  be  considerably  improved. 
But  that  outcome  will  also  depend  on  full  appreci- 
ation  by  private  lenders  of  the  need  to  avoid  actions 
that  tend  to  undercut  Fund  efforts. 
This  does  not  mean  that  Fund  judgments  are  to 
replace  those  of  private  lenders  in  the  determinatijm 
of  which  countries  should  be  accommodated  wish 
private  credit.  Nor  do  I  even  mean  to  suggest  that 
the  texts  of  the  Fund’s  country  evaluations  are  to  be 
handed  around  in  the  private  banking  community. 
Were  that  to  become  a practice,  I am  sure  the  quality 
of such  reports  would  suffer  by  becoming  less explicit 
and  less  frank.  But  some  sharing  of  Fund  informa- 
tion-within  the  limits  imposed  by  requirements  of 
confidentiaiity-  may  still  become  feasibie,  the  most 
logical  conduits  perhaps  being  the  central  banks  of 
the  countries  in  which  the  major  private  lending  in- 
stitutions  are  located. 
Fund  country  reports  are  transmitted  to  central 
banks  as  a  matter  of  routine,  and-as  I  previously 
indicated-new  factual  information  about  individual 
countries  is now  being  developed,  and  more  may  well 
be  developed  later,  by  the  BIS.  Private  lend.ers 
might  want  to  discuss  with  the  staffs  of  central  bznks 
the  flow  of  such  information,  and  this  could  be  done 
-as  would  surely  be  the  Federal  Reservefs  practice 
-without  advising  whether  or  on  what  scale  a  loan 
should  be  made  to  this  or  that  country.  Such  a. con- 
sultative  process,  especially  if  it  also  involved  fre- 
quent  interchange  of  information  among  the  leading 
central  banks,  would  go  quite  far  in  preventing  any 
inadvertent  circumvention  by  private  banks  of  the 
efforts  of  the  IXF  to  promote  financial  stability. 
The  suggestion  I  am  exploring  with  you  for  im- 
proving  the  adjustment  process  obviously  will  not 
work  unless  broadly  shared  agreement  develops  ,that 
international  financial  affairs  require  a  “rule  of  law” 
to  guide  us  through  the  troubled  circumstances  that 
now  exist.  Such  a  rule  cannot  be  codified  in  detail, 
but  it  is essential  that  there  be  broad  agreement  that 
parochial  concerns  will  be  subordinated  to  the  vital 
objective  of  working  our  way  back  to  more  stable 
conditions  in  international  finance.  And  if  the  IMF 
is to  play  a  leadership  role  in  pursuing  this  objectiye, 
it  is not  only  private  parties  that  must  avoid  wedken- 
ing  the  IMF’s  efforts.  Governments  also-indeed 
governments  especially-must  be  prepared  to  forego 
their  own  quite  frequent  inclination  to  do  things  in- 
consistent  with  the  effective  pursuit  of  Fund  ob- 
jectives.  There  have  been  too  many  instances  in 
which  the  government  of  a  country  negotiating  a 
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attempted  to  circumvent  the  Fund  by  seeking  instead 
a  loan  from  another  government  or  by  exerting  out- 
side  political  pressure  on  Fund  officials  in  an  effort 
to  make  loan  conditions  as  lenient  as  possible.  If 
the  rule  of  law  in  international  monetary  affairs  is 
ultimately  to  prevail,  all  countries-there  can  be  no 
exceptions-must  fully  respect  the  IMF’s  integrity. 
Our  first  requisite,  therefore,  is for  a new  sense  of 
commitment  by  governments  as  well  as  private 
parties  to  a  responsible  code  of  behavior.  I  believe 
that  understanding  of  this  need  has  been  growing- 
certainly  within  our  own  government.  And,  of 
course,  the  working  of the  marketplace-tending  now 
to  make  credit  less  readily  available  to  some  foreign 
borrowers-is  helping  to  foster  a new  set  of attitudes. 
As  I  noted  earlier,  the  payments  difficulties  of 
countries  outside  the  OPEC  group  reflect  many 
factors  besides  the  way  in  which  the  burden  of  oil 
costs  happens  to  have  been  distributed.  It  is  im- 
portant  that  adjustment  proceed  along  several  paths 
in  this  vast  part  of  the  world. 
First,  countries  whose  external  position  has  been 
weakened  by  loose  financial  policies  are  going  to 
have  to  practice  some  fiscal  and  monetary  restraint, 
either  of  their  own  volition  or  because  they  find  it 
obligatory  to  do  so  in  order  to  maintain  access  to 
international  credit  facilities,  including  those  of  the 
IMF.  In  individual  instances,  the  adjustment  process 
in  such  countries  may  at  times  also  entail  allowing 
some  depreciation  of  the  foreign  exchange  value  of 
their  currencies. 
Second,  since  the  burden  of adjustment  cannot  and 
should  not  rest  with  deficit  countries  alone,  those 
non-OPEC  countries  that  are  experiencing  signifi- 
cant  and  persistent  current-account  surpluses  must 
understand  that  they  too  have  adjustment  obligations. 
In  saying  this,  I do  not  mean  to  imply  that  we  should 
urge  such  countries  to  pursue  expansionist  policies 
that  could  undo  or  jeopardize  the  hard-won  progress 
that  some  of  them  have  made  in  curbing  inflation. 
That  would  be both  wrong  and  unwise.  What  I mean 
is simply  that  such  countries  should  not  actively  resist 
tendencies  toward  appreciation  in  the  value  of  their 
currencies  in  foreign-exchange  markets.  Such  ap- 
preciation  will  aid  other  countries  by  facilitating  ac- 
cess  to  the  markets  of  the  countries  in  surplus;  and 
at  the  same  time  it  will  make  imported  goods  and 
services  available  at  a  lower  cost  to  the  citizens  of 
the  surplus  countries,  thus  reinforcing  their  con- 
structive  efforts  to  control  inflation. 
Third,  practically  all  non-OPEC  countries-the 
deficit  and  surplus  countries  alike-must  treat  energy 
conservation  as  a  key  element  of  their  economic 
policy.  This  is something  to  which  the  United  States 
in  particular  must  give  the  closest  attention.  We 
are  by  far  the  largest  single  consumer  of  energy  in 
the  world,  and  we  have  so  far  been  notably  laggard 
in  addressing  the  energy  problem.  This  year  im- 
ported  oil  will  probably  account  for  over  40%  of 
domestic  consumption  of  petroleum,  up  from  22% 
in  1970.  Our  passive  approach  to  energy  policy, 
besides  endangering  the  Nation’s  future,  has  aggra- 
vated  strains  in  the  international  financial  system, 
because  we  are  directly  responsible  for  a  large  part 
of  the  OPEC  surplus.  And,  of  course,  our  huge 
appetite  for  oil  has  added  to  the  leverage  of  those 
OPEC  members  that  have  been  most  reckless  in 
urging  a  still  higher  price  of  oil.  The  energy  pro- 
gram  being  prepared  by  President  Carter  unques- 
tionably  will  entail  sacrifices  by  many  of our  citizens. 
It  is  essential,  however,  that  we  at  long  last  recog- 
nize  that  a  decisive  conservation  effort  must  be  a 
major  part  of  our  Nation’s  economic  policy. 
If,  in  fact,  we  can  build  momentum  into  payments 
adjustment  by  the  non-OPEC  group  of  countries 
along  these  three  paths-that  is,  internal  discipline 
by  countries  in  deficit,  non-resistance  to  exchange- 
rate  appreciation  by  countries  in  surplus,  and  deter- 
mined  energy  conservation  by  all-the  favorable  con- 
sequences  will  be  enormous.  To  the  extent  that 
energy  conservation  is  effective,  the  present  serious 
imbalance  of  the  non-OPEC  group  of  nations  vis-a- 
vis  OPEC  will  be reduced.  Beyond  that,  there  will  no 
longer  be  such  extremely  large  differences  in  the 
balance-of-payments  status  of the  non-OPEC  nations. 
Consequently,  the  risk  of  disruption  of  the  interna- 
tional  financial  system  would  be  greatly  reduced, 
and  we  could  have  greater  confidence  that  progress 
will  be  realized  around  the  world  in  reducing  unem- 
ployment  and  otherwise  improving  economic  condi- 
tions. 
There  is  a  critical  proviso,  however,  to  this  opti- 
mistic  assessment-namely,  that  the  OPEC  group, 
seeing  their  surplus  decline  as  a  result  of  foreign 
conservation  efforts  or  their  own  increasing  imports, 
will  not  seek  to  compensate  for  the  decline  by  a  new 
round  of  oil-price  increases.  Obviously,  if they  were 
to  do  so-and  if  they  could  make  the  action  stick- 
the  whole  exercise  of  trying  to  reduce  the  massive 
payments  imbalances  traceable  to  the  oil  shock  would 
be  rendered  futile. 
Effective  oil  conservation  and  the  development  of 
other  sources  of  energy  would,  of  course,  militate 
against  such  an  outcome  to  the  extent  that  those 
efforts  lessened  OPEC’s  market  leverage.  That  is 
important  for  the  longer  run,  but  particularly  in  the 
years  immediately  ahead  it  is  vital  that  the  members 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  17 of  OPEC  recognize  that  their  economic  and  political 
future  cannot  be  divorced  from  that  of  the  rest  of the 
world.  Besides  practicing  forbearance  with  regard 
to  the  price  of  oil,  it  would  be  very  helpful  if  they 
made  larger  grants  of assistance  to  the  less  developed 
countries  and  also  expanded  the  volume  of  loans  and 
investments  made  directly  abroad-so  that  the  inter- 
mediation  of  American  or  European  commercial 
banks  may  be  substantially  reduced.  Fortunately, 
there  are  various  signs  that  the  more  influential 
_~  members  of  OPEC  are  becoming  increasingly  aware 
that  their  self-interest  requires  a  major  contribution 
along  these  lines.  The  OPEC  group  has  become  a 
large  factor  in  international  finance,  and  there  is 
some  basis  for  confidence  that  they  will  play  a  con- 
structive  role  in  the  reestablishment  of  order  in  the 
international  financial  structure. 
In  the  course  of  my  remarks  tonight,  I  have 
touched  on a number  of actions  that  either  need  to  be 
taken  or  avoided  to  achieve  a  new  sense  of  order  in 
international  finance.  Let  me  conclude  by  sketching 
or  restating  the  responsibilities,  as  I  see  them,  of  the 
major  participants  in  the  international  financial 
system  : 
First,  in  order  to  contribute  to  a  more  stable 
international  system,  the  I>$F  must  act  with  new 
assertiveness  in  monitoring  the  economic  policies  of 
its  members.  To  give  the  Fund  added  leverage  for 
such  a  role,  its  resources  must  be  enlarged.  But 
those  resources  must  be used  sparingly  and  dispensed 
only  when  applicant  countries  agree  to  pursue  effec- 
tive  stabilization  policies.  In  view  of  the  clear  need 
for  better  financial  discipline  around  the  world,  this 
would  be  a  poor  time  for  a  new  allocation  of  SDR’s 
-or,  in plain  language,  printing  up  new  international 
money. 
Second,  national  governments  must  encourage  and 
support  the  IXF,  so  that  it  can  become  an  effective 
guardian  of  evolving  law  in  the  international  mone- 
tary  sphere.  Governments  need  to  resist  the  tempta- 
tion  to  circumvent  the  Fund  by  seeking  bilateral 
official  loans  or  to  embarrass  the  Fund  by  exerting 
political  pressure  on  Fund  officials.  Commercial  and 
investment  bankers  also  need  to  recognize  that  their 
actions  must  not  undercut  I&IF  efforts  to  speed 
adjustment.  The  IMF,  in  its  turn,  will  have  to  equ,ip 
itself  to  handle  appropriately  its  new  and  larger 
responsibilities. 
Third,  a better  framework  of knowledge  for  evalu- 
ating  the  creditworthiness  of  individual  countries  is 
badly  needed.  Among  other  things,  central  banks 
could  work  together  through  the  BIS  and  establish  a 
common  list  of  informational  items  that  borrowing 
countries  will  be  expected  to  supply  to  lenders. 
Fourth,  commercial  and  investment  bankers  need 
to  monitor  their  foreign  lending  with  great  care,  and 
bank  examiners  need  to  be  alert  to  excessive  concen- 
tration  of  loans  in  individual  countries. 
Fifth,  protectionist  policies  need  to  be  shunned  by 
all  countries. 
Sixth,  countries  with  persistent  payments  defici.ts 
need  to  adopt  effective  domestic  stabilization  policies. 
Seventh,  non-OPEC  countries  experiencing  larige 
and  persistent  payments  surpluses  also  need  to  adjust 
their  economic  policies  and  they  can  probably  best 
do so by allowing  some  appreciation  of their  exchange 
rates. 
Eighth,  all  countries,  and  especially  the  United 
States,  need  to  adopt  stringent  oil  conservation  poii- 
ties  and,  wherever  possible,  speed  the  development 
of  new  energy  sources. 
Ninth,  the  members  of  OPEC  must  avoid  a  new 
round  of  oil-price  increases.  They  also  need  to  play 
an  increasingly  constructive  role  in  assisting  the  less 
developed  countries  and  in  the  evolution  of  the  inter- 
national  financial  system. 
Observance  of  these  do’s  and  don’ts  wonld  go  a 
sipificant  distance,  in  my  judgment,  in  meeting  t:ne 
formidable  challenges  that  now  confront  us.  But  we 
shall  undoubtedly  need  to  be  ready  to  improvise  in 
the  fluid  and  complex  area  of  international  finance. 
I  have  no  illusions  that  the  ideas  that  I  have  pre- 
sented  here  tonight  can  serve  as  a  rigid  blueprint.  I 
hope,  however,  that  they  will  have  some  value  in 
suggesting  directions  in  which  governments,  private 
lenders,  and  official  institutions  need  to  move.  13y 
working  together  towards  a  rule  of  law  in  interna- 
tional  finance,  we  shall  be  contributing  to  a  stable 
prosperity  both  for  our  own  citizens  and  those  of  our 
trading  partners. 
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